(Ponto Final/João Carlos Malta) — José Ramos Horta is one of the leading figures in lusophony — a pragmatist who has advocated greater economic proximity between Timor-Leste and China to reduce dependence on Indonesia. In this interview, he says no one will give Beijing lessons on the political system to adopt, and he prefers to look at what China has achieved rather than what it does not yet have.
A Pragmatist’s View on China
How can anyone criticize the regime in a country with 1.4 billion people? That is the challenge Ramos Horta poses to those who question his pragmatic approach to Chinese investment and governance.
China, he argues, has earned the right to determine its own political system. Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation initiative freed hundreds of millions from extreme poverty and restored China’s dignity as a nation — a nation that had been invaded and exploited by France, Britain, the United States, and Japan, with millions dying at the hands of poverty or building other countries’ railways.
He points to a phenomenon he says is rarely cited: if China were truly a closed, totalitarian regime, tens of millions of Chinese citizens would not travel freely around the world, and the overwhelming majority of those who study abroad would not return home. Their return, he says, signals genuine satisfaction — something citizens of genuinely oppressive regimes do not demonstrate.
“I’m not worried about anything. China has evolved politically. Today there is much more scrutiny of the ruling elite, and the system has alternation.”
Timor-Leste’s Economic Dependencies
On the question of Chinese investment in Timor-Leste, Ramos Horta is direct: the concern is misplaced when compared to Indonesia’s dominance.
- 70% of Timor-Leste’s trade is with Indonesia
- Timor-Leste is almost entirely dependent on Indonesian airlines and travel agencies for connectivity
- Chinese investors are welcome precisely because they help reduce that dependency
His argument for diversification is strategic, not ideological. Greater Chinese presence in airlines and tourism, he says, makes Timor-Leste less reliant on any single partner — Indonesia or Australia — and broadens the country’s regional relationships.
Twenty Years of Independence: Progress and Failures
Ramos Horta describes the development leap since 2002 as “brutal” — but acknowledges serious unfinished work.
What Has Improved
| Area | 2002 | Today |
|---|---|---|
| Doctors | 19 | ~1,000 |
| Regional hospitals | 0 | 5 (plus national hospital) |
| Foreign staff at Ministry of Finance | 50–100 | 0 |
| Foreign staff at Central Bank | Present | 0 (only a few consultants) |
| Portuguese speakers | ~7% | ~30% |
| Masters and doctorate holders | Very few | Hundreds, trained in Portugal, Australia, USA, Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore |
Timor-Leste is also classified by Freedom House as the best democracy in Southeast Asia, and by press freedom monitors as having one of the most free press environments in the world and the region.
Where the Country Has Failed
Ramos Horta is blunt about the failures:
- Agriculture: Coffee production has not doubled despite the potential; the government has done little to improve coffee culture
- Rice: Timor-Leste remains a major rice importer — something he calls unjustifiable
- Malnutrition: 30–40% of the population is undernourished; in 2017, UNICEF reported 58.1% suffering moderate to severe malnutrition. “These numbers are unacceptable,” he says
- Corruption: Has increased, learned partly from neighbouring Indonesia
The root cause, he argues, is not a lack of resources or vision — it is the absence of competent, dedicated, and honest public administration. Academic qualifications alone do not produce effective executives. Without a functioning bureaucracy to implement policy, even the best-conceived plans fail.
Political Instability and Generational Renewal
Despite periods of instability, Ramos Horta notes that budgets passed in both 2018 and 2019, and there has been no political violence in Timor-Leste. The instability, he says, is purely a power struggle — not driven by social, ethnic, or religious divisions.
On generational renewal, he pushes back against the conventional narrative:
- The Prime Minister belongs to the new generation
- No member of the 1975 generation holds a government post
- The judiciary is even younger
The generation of 1975 retains influence not through power, but through historical legitimacy and the deep cultural respect Timorese society gives to age. Younger leaders, he observes, continue to defer to figures like Xanana Gusmão rather than fully claiming authority for themselves.
The Constitution and Presidential Powers
Timor-Leste’s semi-presidential constitution — modelled closely on Portugal’s — gives the President powers that can block government appointments and veto budgets. Ramos Horta believes this structure, while functioning well in a mature democracy like Portugal (with 800 years of statehood), generates friction in a young nation still building its democratic culture. He does not advocate abandoning multi-partyism — but sees simplifying the constitutional balance of power as worthwhile.
Papua and the Limits of Analogy
Asked whether Timor-Leste’s independence struggle is analogous to Papua’s, Ramos Horta draws a firm distinction:
- Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony for 500 years — Indonesian annexation had no colonial or historical basis in international law
- Papua was integrated into Indonesia through the same Dutch colonial process that shaped the entire Indonesian archipelago
- Indonesia has given genuine autonomy to Papua, including an elected governor and provincial government; the commander of the entire Indonesian navy is Papuan
He acknowledges that Jakarta’s large development budgets for Papua — USD 10 billion in 2017 for a population of four million — do not address “questions of the soul and the heart.” But he does not equate the situation to Timor’s, either historically or legally.
Relations with Portugal, Macau, and the Lusophone World
Portugal
Ramos Horta describes Portugal as Timor-Leste’s “best friend,” even accounting for recent tensions — notably the case of Tiago and Fong Fong Guerra, convicted of money laundering, for whom the Portuguese embassy issued passports while proceedings were ongoing.
He is careful not to comment on the substance of the case, but criticises what he sees as disproportionate sentencing in Timorese corruption cases more broadly. A five-year sentence for a minister in a case involving USD 4,000, he argues, lacks proportionality and compassion. He notes that Portugal applies far more lenient standards in comparable financial crimes.
On language: Portuguese has never been more widely spoken in Timor-Leste. In 1975, approximately 7% of the population spoke it. Today the figure is around 30%. Portuguese, he argues, is inseparable from Timorese identity — reinforced by 98% Catholic faith and a Tetum language in which seven out of ten words are derived from Portuguese.
Macau
Ramos Horta has visited Macau many times and speaks warmly of how Beijing has developed it — allowing casino expansion as a deliberate strategy to give the territory financial weight and reduce its sense of inferiority relative to Hong Kong.
However, he is candid that the relationship between Macau and Timor-Leste is underdeveloped:
- Only one private Macanese investor holds shares in Timor Telecom
- No direct public or institutional investment flows exist
- Part of the failure is Timorese: Dili has not presented concrete proposals for how Macau could sponsor health, nutrition, or infrastructure projects
His vision is a Macau house in Timor-Leste — a platform to channel Macanese and broader Chinese investment into the country, particularly in areas like combating malnutrition and building health infrastructure. That vision, he admits, has not yet been realised.