An Australian academic told the Lusa news agency that the UN Transitional Administration that led Timor-Leste to independence in 2002 failed to create some of the essential functions of the government, influencing the country’s political system.
“In some respects, it was a very successful mission, but not in others,” said Sue Ingram, an Australian academic who was part of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and was the first administrator in the Aileu district.
“The transition to independence was achieved, but as José Ramos-Horta said at the time, what the UN left was an outline of a state card. A stage set up, but that was an illusion,” she recalled.
A Mission of Mixed Results
For Sue Ingram, the way the mission operated — without creating the necessary machinery for an independent state — left important shortcomings in the future apparatus of governance.
She recalled that the transitional administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, had a mandate that gave him “plenipotentiary powers,” creating a full tutelage with executive, legislative, and judicial powers “deposited in a single individual.”
Below the Brazilian who led the transitional mission, there was an “eclectic collection of people, some with great competence and understanding and others, unfortunately, without having the slightest idea” of what was at stake.
“It was a great challenge to make it work,” she said, noting that she requested to be transferred to the districts, taking on the leadership of the administration in Aileu, south of Dili.
Missing Government Machinery
When she returned to Dili, where she was seconded to the National Planning Authority, Ingram observed that “although there is a transition plan and transition benchmarks, many things were missing” — especially in the functions of the future Government.
“There were many things that should be the functions of the Government that were integrated into parts of the UN mission and had not been separately prepared as part of the process of building the Government machinery,” she said.
“There were global and sectoral views, but the mechanics of the Government had not been built, because they were functions integrated into the mission itself.” The most basic functions of government were not developed, yet they were essential to the machinery of an independent state.
Political Transition and the Constituent Assembly
On the political transition side, Ingram argues that the UN used a model that ended up “greatly influencing how the political system would eventually be built after independence,” including the creation of the Constituent Assembly itself.
The developed system — which included a representative from each district — gave Fretilin a disproportionate share of seats in the Constituent Assembly (approximately 62.5%) despite receiving only 56% of the national vote, due to the 12–13 district representatives allocated.
“Instead of an inclusive constitution that everyone could subscribe to, the text that left the assembly had a disturbing minority that did not support it. A sad legacy for a country that was about to start its life as an internationally recognized independent state,” she said.
The constitution was approved on 22 March 2002 with 72 votes in favour, 14 against, and 1 abstention.
Sue Ingram’s Connection to Timor-Leste
Ingram is a researcher with almost 20 years of experience in governance in Australia and internationally. She currently leads the Timor Update conferences at the Australian National University (ANU) and served as administrator in Aileu in 2000.
Her connection to Timor-Leste began by chance: Indonesia did not grant her a study visa for research she intended to conduct in northern Sumatra, and the first alternative visa to arrive was from Portuguese Timor. Ingram arrived in Dili in July 1974 intending to study anthropology, but soon found it impossible for the political context of the time not to permeate any research work.
The political situation eventually prevented her academic work from moving forward, and Ingram entered the Australian civil service — where she rose to senior positions — with Timor-Leste remaining a “wound” she was reluctant to revisit.
The Violence of 1999
Her return to Timor-Leste came many years later, prompted by the violence of 1999 — particularly the destruction that marked the post-referendum period.
“The explosion of post-referendum violence has caused me a great deal of pain and a strong feeling that I have to go back to Timor,” she said, adding that she responded to a candidacy put forward by the Australian Government at the request of the United Nations.
“Personally it affected me a lot. I was shocked by the systematic destruction,” she said.
Ingram noted that Indonesia “seems to have made a conscious decision to withdraw everything it has done in East Timor,” with a destruction that goes beyond statistics and reveals the planning detail behind what occurred — with estimates suggesting 70–80% of public infrastructure was destroyed.